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nized grounds for equity jurisdiction. 4 The plaintiff must show
that his injury is irreparable and that his remedy at law is inade-
quate. The terms irreparable and inadequate are not capable of a
precise definition, therefore, each case must be decided on its in-
dividual merits. In North Dakota the statutory provisions must al-
ways be kept in mind. " , A study of the cases indicates that a very
strong case of prejudice to the plaintiff's rights must be presented
before the court will grant a temporary injunction or restraining
order ex parte or without a hearing. The effect of issuing a tempo-
rary injunction ex parte is to make the first notice of the action to
the defendant the service of the writ on him. The court's reluctance
to enjoin without notice is understandable. If a clear prima facie
case is established, a temporary restraining order may be obtained
until a hearing can be had on whether a temporary injunction may
issue. Once the plaintiff's rights have been established, a final in-
)unction may issue in aid of the decree.
RAYMOND HAGEN.
COURTS - EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - MANDAMUS I N N o R T H
DAKOTA. - Mandamus is a writ of ancient and obscure origin.' Its
purpose was to prevent a failure of justice by compelling inferior
courts to exercise their ministerial and judicial powers.2 Originally
it was a prerogative writ, issued by the king.3 Later it became a
prerogative of the legislature and finally it vested in the Court of
King's Bench.' It has been defined as "a writ usually issuing out of
the highest court of general jurisdiction in a state, in the name of
the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or in-
ferior court of judicature within its jurisdiction, requiring them to
do some particular thing therein specified and which pertains to
their office or duty."5 The purpose of the writ as set forth by the
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 is "to compel the performance
of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled
64. Strobeck v. McWilliams, 42 N. D. 30, 171 N.W. 865 (1919).
65. N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-06 (-943); N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-05 (1943).
1. See High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 5 (1896).
2. Ibid.
3. Commonwealth ex rel. 'thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny, 32 Pa. (8 Casey)
218, 223 (1858) (dictumn).
4. Ibid.
5. Bouvier, Law Dictionary (14th ed. 1873).
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and from which he is precluded unlawfully by such inferior tri-
bunal, corporation, board or person."'
While mandamus is generally considered to be an ordinary civil
remedy, 7 in North Dakota the statute provides that the writ of
mandamus shall be a special proceeding." An ordinary proceeding
is an action in a court of justice whereby one party prosecutes an-
other for the protection or the enforcement of a right, redress or
prevention of a wrong, or for the punishment of a public offense;
every other remedy is a special proceeding. It is triable to the
court, but factual issued may be tried to a jury. 10 Even in North
Dakota mandamus has taken on many aspects of an ordinary civil
action or remedy.1
Some of the earlier North Dakota cases hold that the writ of
mandamus is a prerogative writ.12  However, the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943 provides "the writ must be issued in all cases
when there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
c-rdinary course of law."' This has been construed to mean that t-he
court has no alternative but to issue the writ where the necessary
prerequisites are present, 4 and would mean to indicate that man-
damus is a writ of right.15 From a practical viewpoint the issuance
of the writ seems to be one of sound discretion, 6 and if the courts
believe that the necessary prerequisites are present, they will issue
the writ.1 7 The discretion is not absolute, but is to be exercised
in conformity with the rules of law and the court's experience.1"
Of course the Supreme Court will first determine if the case is one
calling for the exercise of its original jurisdiction. 9
6. § 32-3401.
7. 2 Spelling, Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 1167 (1901).
8. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-3201 (1943).
9. State ex rel. Bickford v. Fabrick, 16 N. D. 94, 112 N.W. 74, 75 (1907) (dictum).
Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (A special proceeding is a generic term for all civil
remedies which are not ordinary actions).
10. State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Johnstone, 6 N. D. 727, 262 N.W. 193, 194 (1907)
(dictum).
11. Schmitz v. Olsness, 59 N. D. 673, 231 N.W. 722, 723 (1930) (dictum). State
e: rel. Dakota Hail Association of Plankington v. Carey, 2 N. D. 42, 49 N.W. 164, 165
(1891) (dictum).
12. See State ex rel. Davies v. Willis, 19 N. D. 209, 124 N.W. 706 (1910); State
ex rel. Shaw v. Thompson, 21 N. D. 426, 131 N.W. 231 (1911).
13. § 32-3402.
14. See Wallace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 69 N. D. 167, 284
N.W. 420 (1939).
15. See State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1896).
16. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Ely, 24 N. D. 619, 137 N.W. 834 (1912).
17. Ibid.
18. 2 Spelling, Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies, 1178 (1901).
19. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N. D. 525, 160 N.W. (1916) (court held it
could exercise jurisdiction when a controversy between a majority of the present members
of the Supreme Court and other successful candidates at last election who claim a right to
occupy such offices and exercise the duties thereof); State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88,
45 N.W. 33 (1890).
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS TO ISSUE
WRITS OF MANDAMUS
The North Dakota Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to
issue writs of mandamus when it is necessary in the exercise of their
jurisdiction." Since they exercise three types of jurisdiction, appel-
late, supervisory and original, mandamus may be used to imple-
nent any of the three.2t Before the Supreme Court will exercise
its original jurisdiction, however, the case must be publici juris
affecting the sovereignty of the state, its franchise, prerogative, or
the liberties of the people.2- This rule applies only to The Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, and does not pertain to the writs which
may be issued by that court in the exercise of its power of superin-
tending control over inferior courts or in the exercise of its appel-
late jurisdiction.2 3 In State ex rel. Heffron v. District Court for Stark
County,-4 petitioner requested the Supreme Court to mandamus
the District Court to try a contempt proceeding where the lower
court had previously held that it did not have jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held that under the superintending control granted
to it by the North Dakota Constitution, it may review a decision of
the inferior court and consider whether it was the duty of such in-
lerior court to hear the controversy. The power of superiutending
control, however, was not meant to supplant the review by appeal,
but is only to be exercised in cases where other relief is inadequate
or incomplete25
The District Courts of North Dakota are also empowered to issue
writs of mandamus.21 In matters not publici juris or affecting "Lhe
sovereignty of the state and its franchises, i. e. where the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction, it has been felt that it was not the
purpose of the Constitution to give the district court and the
20. N. D. Const., art. IV, § 87; N. D. Rev. Code § 27-0204 (1943 provides: "The
Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction only, except when otherwise specially
provided by law or by the Constitution. Such court in the exercise of its original jurisdic-
tion may issue writs of . . . mandamus . . . (and) in the exercise of its appellate juris-
diction, and superintending control over inferior courts, it may issue such original and
remedial writs as are necessary to the proper exercise of its jurisdcition."
21. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 66 N.W. 234, 235 (1896) (dic-
tum). For a discussion on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see Burke, The Pre-
rogative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 32 N. Dak. L. Rev. 199 (1956).
22. State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 45 N.W. 33, 38 (1890) (dictum).
23. State ex rel. Jacobson v. District Court for Ward County, 68 N. D. 211, 277 N.W.
843 (1938).
24. 26 N. D. 32, 143 N.W. 143 (1913).
25. See State ex rel. Red River Brick Corporation v. District Court of Grand Forks
County, 24 N. D. 31, 138 N.W. 988 (1912) ("Superintending power is not given for
purposes of review as by oppeal. It is given to insure harmonious working for our judicial
systems, to meet emergencies, and for cases where other relief is inadequate or incomplete").
26. N. D. Const., art. IV, § 103; N. D. Rev. Code § 27-0506 (1943).
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Supreme Court concurrent jurisdiction. -7 Thus, except where man-
damus is sought in the exercise of the appellate or supervisory pow-
ers, a suitor must apply to a district court to enforce strictly private
rights.-1
PROPER PARTIES IN PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Where the state itself is directly interested in the writ, the At-
torney General is the proper party to apply for it or in some manner
signify his assent to the petition.3 9 Should the Attorney General
refuse to bring the petition or unreasonably delay in doing so, the
court will still exercise its original jurisdiction on petition of a pri-
vate party.;" The Attorney General has no duty to represent the
state in court in any case where the name of the state is inserted
only as a formality, and is not in fact an interested party.3 t If the
controversy concerns a large class of citizens in common, but not
the state as such, the writ may be properly made by a citizen of the
class affected.32 Mandamus to enforce a purely private right should
be brought by the party beneficially interested, and not in the name
of the state on relation of such interested party.3 3 If the right is
sought by an individual relator alone, he must show that he is in
some way peculiarly affected.
34
NECESSARY PREREQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
There are two prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of man-
ctamus. First, the relator must show that he has a clear legal right
to the performance of a particular duty, and second, that no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available at law."5 Conse-
quently where the relators sought to enforce a payment of old age
27. See Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 11 N. D. 536, 90 N.W. 13 (1902); State ex
rl. McArthur v. MeClean, 35 N. D. 204, 159 N.W. 847 (1916) ("Test of jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court where issuance of an original writ is prayed for . . . is whether the
individual relator is in fact a necessary party or a mere incident and whether after all it fs
a public injury which is sought to be remedied or prevented, and involves the franchise
and prerogatives of the state").
28. See Duluth Elevator Co. v. White, 11 N. D. 536, 90 N.W. 13 (1902); State v.
Nelson County, 1 N. D. 85, 45 N.W. 33 (1890) ("Purpose was to devolve upon district
courts which are readily accessible and at all times open for public business, the duty of
assuming original cognizance of all ordinary cases which are remediable by means of the
writs, and confer upon the Supreme Court in exercise of a discretion vested in it the duty
of taking original cognizance only in a limited class of cases . . .").
29. State ex rel. Dakota Hail Assoc. of Plankinton v. Carey, 2 N. D. 42, 49 N.W. 164,
165 (1891) (dictum) (Where the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce a duty due to
the state as such the proceeding is to be entitled "in the name of State ex rel. __ ").
30. See State ex erl. MeArthur v. McLean, 35 N. D. 204, 159 N.W. 847 (1916).
31. State ex rel. Dakota Hail Assoc. of Plankinton v. Carey, 2 N. D. 42, 49 N.W.
164, 166 (1891) (dictum).
32. See State ex rel. Braatlien v. Drakeley, 26 N. D. 96, 143 N.W. 770 (1913).
33. N D. Rev. Code § 32-3202 (1943).
34. State ex rel. Dakota Hail Assoc. of Plankinton v. Carey, 2 N. D. 42, 49 N.W. 164,
166 (1891) (dictum) (Petitioner must show that he will suffer some special damage as
cLumpared to the general class of people if the writ does not issue).
35. Strauss v. Costello, 29 N. D. 215, 150 N.W. 874, 875 (1915) (dictum).
NOTES
asssitance but failed to show the amount of their income from their
homestead so that the amount of assistance due could be deter-
mined, the court refused mandatory relief on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had not shown their clear legal right to the performance
they demanded. 3" An adequate remedy has been construed to mean
a civil remedy and not a criminal remedy. Any incidental delay
occasioned by an appeal would not justify issuance of the writ be-
cause of the lack of a speedy remedy.
3
APPLICATION OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INFERIOR COURTS
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce performance by
public officers of plain, legal, and imperative duties imposed by
their office31 A public office has been defined as "a public position
to which a portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legisla-
tive, or executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being and which
is exercised for the benefit of the public." 0 Where the plaintiff paid
.,pecial assessment taxes to a county treasurer for a drainage fund,
the court held that upon collection of taxes mandamus will lie to
compel a proper apportionment or division thereof among the mu-
nicipalities and officers lawfully entitled thereto." The writ has
been used to compel an insurance commissioner to issue a certifi-
cate of operation to an insurance company,"1 to county commission-
ers to provide funds for office space,- to a state auditor to credit
the account of the Supreme Court with appropriations authorized
by statute for additional members of the court and to issue war-
rants for compensation," to tax boards and officers to issue a proper
tax deed, 4 to the Secretary of State to compel certification of legis-
lative resolutions," and to county auditors to calculate tax levies
and extend them on tax lists against realty subject to taxation.4
36. State v. Borge, 59 N. D. 1, 283 N.W. 521 (1939).
37. See State ex rel. Braatlien v. Drakeley, 26 N. D. 96, 143 N.W. 770 (1913).
38. See Strauss v. Costello, 29 N. D. 215, 150 N.W. 874 (1915) ("If any incidental
dclay occasioned by an appeal would justify issuance of the writ of mandamus, then the
psocedure by means of that writ would be warranted in almost any case which might
arise").
39. See State ex rel. Langer v. Kositzky, 38 N. D. 616, 166 N.W. 534 (1918).
40. State ex rel. McArthur v. McLean, 35 N. D. 203, 159 N.W. 847, 850 (1916)
(dictum); In State ex rel. Kopriva v. Larson, 48 N. D. 1151, 189 N.W. 629 (1922)
(The Supreme Court held that a bank in which was deposited the funds of a county was
a legal depository and as such was in a position quasi official in nature as concerned the
county and mandamus would issue to compel the paying of the money to a new treasurer.).
41. See State ex rel. Viking v. Mikkelson, 24 N. D. 175, 139 N.W. 525 (1912).
42. See Halcomb v. Hamm, 70 N. D. 153, 42 N.W.2d 70 (1950).
43. See Cleary v. Eddy County, 2 N. D. 400, 51 N.W. 586 (1892).
44. See State ex rel. Langer v. Kositzky, 38 N. D. 616, 166 N.W. 534 (1918).
45. See State ex rel. Ebbert v. Fouts, 26 N.D. 599, 145 N.W. 97 (1941).
46. See State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 68 N.W. 418 (1896).
47. See State ex rel. Strutz v. Huber, 69 N. D. 791, 291 N.W. 126 (1940).
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Mandamus has also issued to compel officers to hold their office at
the place designated by law. 4 s It is the proper remedy to compel
the surrender to a successor in office of property, records and in-
signia of that office,4 9 but if title to the office is in dispute quo
warranto would seem to be the appropriate proceeding. 0 How-
ever, if quo warranto would not be a speedy and adequate remedy,
and a prima facie right to the office is shown by the petitioner,
mandamus will lie."'
The Supreme Court by mandamus may compel an inferior court
to exercise jurisdiction where it has been refused. The refusal if
erroneously made constitutes a refusal to perform a legal duty
which mandamus will enforce .5 2 There is an important distinction
between the writ as directed to an inferior court and that directed
to an officer or public body to perform a ministerial function. In
the former, the Supreme Court merely orders the- inferior court to
exercise a discretion or to proceed within its acknowledged powers,
but it cannot be compelled to decide in a particular mtnner." In
the case of public officers, municipal bodies etc., the mandate is to
perform some special act.5 4 Should the act of the public official be
quasi-judicial in character, he may be compelled to 'act, but cannot
be ordered to act in a particular fashion. 55
Mandamus is the remedy for official inaction and will not lie to
correct some wrong already perpetrated, i. e., mandamus is the
remedy for nonfeasance rather than misfeasance."t Even though
;ll the prerequisites are present the writ will be denied if perform-
ance of the act would be nugatory and would render no beneficial
result.Y1 It is not to be used as a substitute for appeal,"8 nor is it to
48. See State ex tel. Little v. Langlie, 5 N. D. 594, 67 N.W. 958 (1896) (A tax-
payer and resident of the county may apply for writ of mandamus to compel county officers
to hold their offices at the legal county seat, and thus it is a proper remedy to determine
whether the county seat has been legally changed).
49. See State ex rel. Kopriva v. Larson, 48 N. D. 144, 189 N.W. 626 (1922).
50. See State ex tel. Johnson v. Meyers, 74 N. D. 678, 19 N.W.2d 745 (1945). For
a discussion of Quo Warranto in North Dakota, see 33 N. Dak. L. Rev. 98 (1957).
51. See State ex rel. Langer v. McDonald, 41 N. D. 392, 170 N.W. 874 (1919); State
ex tel. Butler v. Callahan, 4 N.D. 481, 61 N.W. 1025 (1895); But see State ex tel.
Wehe v. North Dakota Workman's Compensation Bureau, 46 N. D. 156, 180 N.W. 51
(1920) (Case appears to be contra, but perhaps can be reconciled in that all the cases
seem to agree that if the defendant had color of title, mandamus would not lie.).
52. See State ex rel. Heffron v. District Court for Stark County, 26 N. D. 32, 143 N.W.
143 (1913).
53. See Strauss v. Costello, 29 N. D. 215, 150 N.W. 874 (1915).
54. See Halcomb v. Hamm, 70 N. D. 153, 42 N.W.2d 70 (1950); State ex tel.
Ebbert v. Fouts, 26 N. D. 599, 145 N.W. 97 (1914); State ex tel. Wineman v. Dahl, 6
N D. 81, 68 N.W. 418 (1896).
55. See Mogaard v. City of Garrison, 47 N. D. 473, 182 N.W. 760 (1921); Fuller v.
Board of University and School Lands, 21 N. D. 212, 129 N.W. 1029 (1911).
56. State ex tel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N. D. 184, 277 N.W. 504 (1938).
57. State ex rel. Davies v. Willis, 19 N. D. 209, 124 N.W. 706, 711 (1910) (dictum);
State ex tel. Johnson v. Ely, 23 N. D. 619, 137 N.W. 834, 837 (1912) (dictum).
58. Kelsch v. Dickson, 71 N. D. 430, 1 N.W.2d 347 (1941).
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be employed in place of other legal remedies where adequate legal
action is available.'" Mere contract rights cannot be determined by
mandamus." ° It would seem that mandamus will not issue when the
object is to test the validity of a statute,61 but it has been held that
the court may decide a question of constitutionality if it is raised by
the respondent in defense to a petition for a writ."
PEREMPTORY AND ALTERNATIVE WRITS
The statutes of North Dakota provide that the writ may be either
alternative or peremptory.6 3  Unless the adverse party has notice of
the proceedings, only the alternative writ will be issued first.64 The
peremptory writ, when issued following a hearing on the alterna-
tive writ, should conform in substance to the alternative writ."
More modern concepts have, however, allowed the final writ to be
in any form consistent with the case made by the complaint and
presented and embraced within the issues." The District Courts
also may modify the writ if the reason for so doing goes to the
basis of the claim.17 The peremptory writ does not regularly issue
in a mandamus proceeding until the court by an order of judgment
awards such a writ.G8 It will be awarded only if there is no material
fact in controversy. 9 Therefore an order in a special proceeding
to be appealable must be a final order or affect a substantial right.
7
1
Under the North Dakota Code, if the applicant receives the judg-
59. See Oliver v. Wilson, 8 N. D. 593, 80 N.W. 757 (1899) (Writ of mandamus
was brought against the sheriff to have personal property exemption set aside. Sheriff on
writ of attachment had seized property and refused to turn over the exemption to the
debtor. Court refused the writ, holding that plaintiff had an action for conversion and there-
fore a legal remedy was available).
60. Mootz v. Belyea, 60 N. D. 743, 236 N.W. 358 (1931) (Court will not award a
writ compelling a school board to comply with the terms of a contract of employment with
a teacher, as the teacher has an adequate remedy at law for breach of contract).
61. See Strauss v. Costello, 29 N. D. 215, 150 N.W. 874 (1915).
62. Department of State Highways v. Baker, 69 N. D. 702, 290 N.W. 257 (1940)
(Proceeding brought to compel auditor to disburse public funds under a statute. Attorney
General advised auditor the statute was unconstitutional. The court held the question was
of great public importance, affecting many people and the auditor could raise the question
of constitutionality in a mandamus proceedings).
63. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-3403 (1943).
64. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-3404 (1943).
65. Gunn v. Lauder, 10 N.D. 389, 87 N.W. 999, 1005 (1901) (dictum); N. D.
Rev. Code § 32-3403 (1943) provides: "The alternative writ must state generally the
allegation against the party to whom it is directed and must command such party im-
mediately upon the receipt of the writ, or at some other specified time, to do the act re-
quired to be performed or to show cause before the court at a specified time and place
why he has not done such act. The peremptory writ must be in a similar form except that
the words requiring the party to show cause why he has not obeyed the command must
be omitted and a return day inserted."
66. Ibid.
67. See Schmitz v. Olsness, 59 N. D. 673, 231 N.W. 722 (1930).
68. See Travelers Insurance Company v. Mayer, 2 N. D. 234, 50 N.W. 706. (1891).
69. State ex rel. Diebold Lock Co. v. Gretchell, 3 N, D. 245, 55 N.W. 585, 586
(1893) (dictum).
70. See Warren v. Slaybough, 58 N. D. 910, 228 N.W. 416 (1929).
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ment he may recover damages in addition to a preemptory writ."'
Should the defendant refuse to obey a peremptory of mandamus,
the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 provides for its enforce-
ment by a fine, and imprisonment if necessary.Y"
GERALD W. VANDEWALLE.
71. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-3411 (1943).
72. j 32-3413.
